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This paper examines the profitability of venture capital investment in Europe and the United 
states. It highlights the unfavourable profitability differential of European venture capital 
investment in comparison with the United States. The investment performance measures used 
are the internal rate of return (IRR) and investment multiples. The analysis covers aggregated 
industry returns and venture capital funds’ returns aggregated by vintage year. It relies on the 
VentureXpert private equity and venture capital performance database, maintained by 
Thomson Venture Economics. It also considers developments in the private equity and venture 
capital markets in Europe and the United States.  
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This paper examines the profitability of European venture capital investment and 
presents some comparative analysis of the returns generated by European and US 
venture capital funds. 
 
The analysis is mainly based on the Thomson VentureXpert database maintained by 
Thomson Venture Economics, which is widely used by institutional investors for 
benchmarking venture capital and private equity investment. 
 
On average, the overall profitability of European venture capital investment looks 
low. As of the end of 2003, the average internal rates of return (IRRs) for five and ten 
year investment horizons were 2.3% and 8.3%, respectively. The performance of early 
stage venture investment appears particularly disappointing with five and ten year 
investment horizon IRRs as low as -1.8% and 1.3%. For development stage venture 
investing the IRRs are better, but at 4.6% and 10.7% for five and ten year horizons, 
there is uncertainty about the sustained competitiveness of venture capital in relation 
to other alternative assets, such as hedge funds and real estate, on a risk adjusted 
basis. 
 
The picture that emerges of the US market points to a much more profitable venture 
capital industry with the asset class showing IRRs of 22.8% and 25.4% for five and 
ten year investment horizons as of end 2003. In early stage venture investing the 
performance gap between the European and US funds is even more striking with US 
funds showing IRRs of 54.9% and 37.0% for five and ten year horizons. Also the 
returns produced by development stage investing appear clearly superior at 19.4% and 
20.4% for five and ten year investment horizons as of end 2003. 
 
The venture capital industry is not homogenous, however. There is great dispersion in 
the returns produced by individual funds, in particular in the US but also in Europe. 
By being able to invest in the very best funds, an institutional investor may achieve 
returns that far exceed averages. Conversely, an ill-advised choice of funds could 
result in very poor returns for the investor.  
 
A comparison of the cash distributions paid to investors by European and US venture 
capital funds shows that US funds return cash sooner, indicating that their investments 
are not only more profitable, but also are realised earlier. For the fund investor this 
means that the investment is locked in illiquid assets for a shorter period of time. 
 
The analysis suggests that US venture capital funds benefited more from the high 
asset prices during the technology investment boom than their European counterparts. 
This could be one element in the profitability differential in comparison with 
European funds. The venture capital performance gap recorded between Europe and 
the US could therefore progressively narrow as the effect of the technology boom 
becomes lesser in aggregated fund performance data.  
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The volume of funds raised for future European venture capital investment has 
declined since 2000 as shown by the figures in table 1 below. The low profitability of 
the industry could account for a part of the unfavourable development. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that not all categories of European private equity investing 
produce returns that are inferior to those in the US. European buyout funds generated 
higher returns than their US counterparts for both five and ten year investment 
horizons as of end 2003. In line with the good performance of buyout investment, the 




Funds raised for venture capital and buy-out investment in Europe in 2001-2003 
(€ bn) 
European fund raising (purpose)  2001  2002  2003 
Venture capital  15.0    8.5    6.0 
•  early stage venture investment     6.7    2.8    2.2 
Buy-out investment 23.3  18.3  20.7 
Total private equity*  40.0  27.5  27.0 
*Includes venture capital, buyout investment and investment for which specialisation is not disclosed 
Source: EVCA Yearbook produced by EVCA/Thomson Venture Economics/PricewaterhouseCoopers 
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1.  INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF THE PAPER 
 
The Brussels European Council of March 2003 invited “the Council and the 
Commission to work towards reducing barriers to the creation of a genuine European 
risk capital market, capable of supporting entrepreneurship, and examine inter alia 
obstacles for investment by institutional investors (pension funds) in venture capital 
markets”. In November 2003, the Ecofin Council discussed the Commission 
Communication on the implementation of the Risk Capital Action Plan
2 and, among 
other things, emphasised “that Europe still has some way to go in maximising the 
potential of this sector and that a significant investment gap with the US persists”; the 
Ecofin Council also emphasised the examination of obstacles for venture capital 
investment by institutional investors. 
 
The present paper analyses the profitability of venture capital investment in Europe 
and the United States. It aims to contribute to the policy discussion on barriers to 
venture capital investment by providing economic analysis to complement regulatory 
work. There is little in the way of academic research available on the level of returns 
of venture capital investment. The lack of information accessible through public 
sources could be the explanation. This paper relies on data collected and processed by 
Thomson Venture Economics, some of them already released by the European Private 
Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) and the US National Venture Capital 
Association (NVCA). Some large pension funds have also been kind enough to 
provide their views on the market. The EIF has been particularly supportive. 
 
The focus of the paper is on venture capital, the financing of companies at their early 
or development stage, rather than on the wider private equity market
3 including the 
financing of buy-outs of established companies. The European buy-out market can be 
considered to be working well, whereas the venture capital market is fragile. 
 
The analysis examines venture capital from the point of view of institutional investors 
who allocate a part of their portfolios for investment in venture capital funds. The 
venture capital allocation would be part of an overall allocation for investment in 
alternative assets, including private equity at large, hedge funds and real estate, and 
established with a view of optimising overall investment returns within the framework 
of the relevant investment horizon (defined, for instance, by the maturity of a pension 
fund). The alternative asset classes are ‘alternative’ to the extent that their risk/return 
profile, liquidity and investment horizons are different from those of the traditional 
investments in bonds and stock exchange quoted shares. For investment in venture 
capital by institutional investors to be sustainable, it must generate returns that are 
consistent with its risk/return profile and investment horizon. 
 
                                                 
2 COM/654final of 4.11.2003 
 
3 Private equity provides equity capital to enterprises not quoted on a stock market. Private 
equity encompasses both investment in buyouts and venture capital. 
Buyout investment refers to the acquisition of a company or business unit. It includes 
management buyouts (MBO), management buyins (MBI) and leveraged buyouts (LBO). 
Venture capital is a subset of private equity and refers to equity investments made for the 
launch, early development, or expansion of a business. 
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The return of investment in venture capital funds is tied to the ability of the fund 
managers to identify and manage investments that make the best possible use of the 
funds entrusted to them by investors. The interests of institutional investors and fund 
managers are not perfectly aligned. The fund manager earns fees, typically 2%-2.5% 
per annum of funds under management, plus a share of realised profits (carried 
interest), typically set at 20%. The fund manager is able to charge regular fees from 
the beginning of the fund’s life, whereas the investor only receives a return if and 
when the fund generates profits that exceed the fees paid to the fund manager. 
 
Venture capital funds are typically set up with an intended life-time of 10-12 years, 
with the first half of the period usually dominated by investment activity and the latter 
by the sale, or more generally, the exiting of the investments. The return of a fund 
depends on the success of the underlying venture investments in potentially high-
growth small and medium enterprises. The investments are illiquid assets, whose 
profitability it is not possible to conclusively determine before they have been sold. It 
follows that it is equally difficult to put a reliable figure on the profitability of a 
venture capital fund before it is well into the period of exiting investments. The 
measuring of the success of investments in venture capital funds thus presents many 
challenges. It is an area where considerable advances have been made during the past 
few years and which is still developing. However, certain industry standards now 
seem widely adopted. Likewise, the availability and quality of industry data is 
advancing. 
 
Concerning the definitions used, throughout the paper the term ‘European venture 
capital investment’ means venture capital funds domiciled in Europe investing both 
domestically and cross-border within Europe and funds domiciled outside Europe but 
primarily investing in Europe. ‘US venture capital investment’ is defined analogously. 
‘Europe’ and ‘European’ covers the EU, and other European countries with active 
venture capital markets of meaningful size. Given that the largest national venture 
capital markets are located in EU countries, for the purposes of the analysis ‘Europe’ 
and ‘EU’ can be taken as the same. 
 
The analysis that follows starts by introducing the usual methods of measuring the 
profitability of investment in venture capital funds in section 2. Section 3 presents the 
profitability of European venture capital investment based on the previously discussed 
performance measures. It is followed by a comparison of the profitability of European 




2.  MEASURING THE PROFITABILITY OF VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS 
 
The measuring of the profitability of investments in venture capital funds is difficult, 
because of the nature of the asset. Apart from a few quoted private equity funds in 
Europe, there are no market quotations on which to rely. Instead, the fair value of a 
venture fund has to be determined through the valuation of its underlying investments.   
 
The valuation of venture investments in growth companies involves considerable 
uncertainty. In order to generate elevated investment returns, venture capital investors 
assume a higher risk/return profile than investors in quoted equity. Venture funds are 
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thus looking to invest in companies that grow faster than stock exchange quoted 
companies on average. For the maximisation of profits, venture capital investors seek 
to time their investment in a company to coincide with a period of rapid growth of the 
company. The successful execution of this strategy depends, firstly, on the ability of 
the venture capitalist to make the investment as close to the beginning of the high-
growth period as possible and, secondly, to sell the investment when the high-growth 
period comes to an end. This may mean investing in a company that has limited or no 
sales as yet and is strongly cash consuming. It follows that the value of the venture 
investment usually keeps going down until and unless there is reasonable certainty of 
the future cash-generation of the investee company. In practice, venture investments 
tend to lose value during the early years, but provided that the business of the investee 
company develops as planned, the losses turn into gains thereafter, sometimes 
spectacularly. 
 
The ‘J-curve’ phenomenon described above means that the early loss of value of an 
investment in a venture capital fund does not necessarily give an indication of the 
profitability of the investment over time. For the same reason, comparing the 
profitability of a two year old fund to one that has been operating for, say, seven or 
eight years would not be meaningful. In order to avoid the distortions that a 
comparison of venture capital funds in different stages in their life-cycle would cause, 
funds are grouped according to their ‘vintage year’, usually defined as the year in 
which they commenced operations by making the first capital call. 
 
The most commonly used methods for determining the profitability of venture capital 
and private equity investment are the internal rate of return (IRR) and investment 




2.1. INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN (IRR) 
 
An IRR calculation of a venture capital fund takes account of both cash and non-cash 
movements in assets. Negative cash flows would include payments for investments 
and management fees. Positive flows would include all cash payments made by the 
fund to its investors whether resulting from exits from investments or dividends 
received from the investee companies, and the net asset value of the investments held 
by the fund. 
 
The IRR of a fund may be calculated for different periods depending on the specific 
purpose of the return calculation or the benchmarks used by the investor itself. 
Typically, the following IRR calculations are applied: 
 
•  Cumulative IRR since inception calculates the return of a fund since its 
commencement of operations. Cumulative return since inception captures the total 
return that a fund has produced during its life up the reference point. It lends itself 
for the comparison of the performance of individual funds established in the same 
year with the assumption that all are similarly affected by the J-curve effect. It 
also permits the comparison of different fund vintages. 
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•  Investment horizon IRR calculates the return generated by a fund during a past 
fixed period, typically over 1, 3, 5, 10 or 20 years up to the most recent date for 
which data is available, for instance 31.12.2003. Investment horizon returns 
permit the examination of venture capital returns against the backdrop of the 
prevailing economic conditions. 
 
For an indication of the performance of a group of funds, the commonly used measure 
is the ‘pooled average’, which treats the relevant sample as one fund. Unless 
otherwise defined, the averages in this paper are pooled averages. 
 
The ‘vintage year IRR’ is particularly useful for comparing the performance of a 
single fund with a group of similar funds. Comparing average pooled returns of 
different vintage years also provides an illustration of how groups of funds evolve and 




2.2. INVESTMENT MULTIPLES 
 
Investment multiples measure the profitability of a venture capital fund by calculating 
the return of the funds as a multiple of the original investment as follows: 
 
TVPI = DPI + RVPI 
 
•  TVPI is the Total Value of the fund’s investments over Paid In capital 
•  DPI is Distributions over Paid In capital and corresponds to the realised portion of 
the fund return calculated on the basis of cash-out/cash-in 
•  RVPI is the Residual Value of the fund assets over Paid In capital and corresponds 
to the unrealised portion of the return 
 
Investment multiples are performance indicators that establish a distinction between 
the realised and unrealised portions of the total return of a venture capital fund or an 






2.3. QUALITY OF VENTURE CAPITAL PERFORMANCE DATA 
 
Institutional investors in venture capital must be able to account for the profitability of 
the investment with reasonable accuracy. For asset allocation purposes, reliable 
indicators are needed for comparing profitability with other asset classes. Venture 
capital investments being private, i.e. unquoted, they cannot be marked to market. To 
overcome this, the industry has developed a number of methods to measure the 
profitability of venture capital funds. Whatever method adopted, and unless a fund has 
been fully liquidated, the measuring of the profitability of a venture capital fund 
involves the valuing of the investments held by the fund. These valuations have a 
significant impact in the calculations of IRRs and multiple indicators. The valuation 
of illiquid assets is difficult and, although in Europe venture capital industry standards 
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exist, it must be assumed that the reliability of valuations varies and that they 
inevitably have a subjective component, introduced by the fund manager’s 
perceptions of the investment and market conditions. Only after a venture capital fund 
has been fully liquidated and all its cash flows are known, can its return be 
conclusively determined. 
 
Thompson Venture Economics is a leading provider of market data on venture capital 
and private equity to institutional investors, funds and industry associations. 
Reflecting the private nature of venture capital and private equity investment, the 
Thomson VentureXpert database is compiled through direct contacts with individual 
venture capital funds, which submit information on capital commitments, cash-flow 
schedules and net asset values. 
 
Currently the VentureXpert database for private equity funds, of which venture capital 
funds are a sub-group, covers 1705 US funds formed between 1969 and 2003 and 881 
European funds formed between 1980 and 2003. In the European dataset, over three 
hundred UK funds account for a large share of the sample
4. 
 
It is clear that the research universe for the performance figures for the European 
private equity industry is a sample, not a census. Also, not all funds in the sample 
provide information, but the data should be broadly representative of the distribution 
of committed capital. The European sample has grown dramatically in recent years, 
rising from 278 funds in 1996 with €20.6 billion of committed capital, to 881 funds 
with committed capital of €158.7 billion in 2003. 
 
Whilst it would seem not likely that the information submitted by the participating 
venture capital funds on their profitability would be systematically distorted, 
especially not downwards, for unliquidated funds, return information is largely based 
on asset valuations that always have an element of subjectivity, as discussed above. It 
has also been suggested that failed funds could choose not to submit data, leading to 




3.  PROFITABILITY OF EUROPEAN VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS 
 
 
3.1. RETURN OF EUROPEAN VENTURE FUNDS PER VINTAGE YEAR 
 
The analysis is based on the available European fund data for the period 1983-2003. It 
should be noted that coverage of the database has evolved since European data 
collection began in 1980. In the eighties, the data only covered the UK, France and 
Germany, the largest national venture capital markets in Europe. In line with the 
development of venture capital markets in other European countries, the coverage has 
                                                 
4 The data from the VentureXpert database used in this paper was extracted in mid-April 2004. Because 
the database is constantly updated different figures could be obtained if the data extraction is performed 
in a different moment. Differences should only be meaningful if the time lapse between extractions 
exceeds a trimester. EVCA performance data used was released in the beginning of June 2004.    
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been progressively enlarged to take account of all significant EU national markets 
including the recently acceded Member States as well as Norway and Switzerland. 
 
An overview of the profitability of the European venture capital industry since 1983 is 
given in chart 1 by showing the cumulative pooled IRR since inception of the 
European venture capital funds in the dataset by vintage year. (Years 1983, 1984, 
1992 and 2003 include a low number of funds. The IRR figures for those years may 
not benefit from adequate diversification and could be overly influenced by the 
performance of just one fund, i.e. one management team.) 
 
Chart 1 
European venture capital funds established in 1983-2003 
Cumulative pooled average IRR since inception by vintage year 

















































         
0 
  Data source: Thomson Venture Economics 
 
In chart 1, the negative IRRs recorded for the years 1998-2003 illustrate the J-curve 
phenomenon. On average, venture capital funds that started operations during the last 
five years have still not yielded a positive return to their investors. The strongly 
negative IRR of the 2002 vintage shows the nature of venture investing: Recently 
made investments in potentially high growth companies have not as yet proven 
themselves. The graduated returns of the 1998-2002 vintage funds mirror the 
evolution of the underlying investments, and give an indication of the length of time 
during which a fund investor should expect to have to book losses. The 2003 funds 
show a zero return, possibly because the value of their investments was not subject to 
significant adjustment during the short active life of the funds. 
 
The very high average return of 49.9% shown for the funds that started operations in 
1995 could be explained by the maturing of their investments at a time when 
particularly high prices were paid for technology assets during the run up to the peak 
of the technology boom. Another possible explanation could be that the 1995 vintage 
includes a number of funds that have been extraordinarily profitable to the extent to 
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substantially increase the vintage average. The maximum IRR reported for funds in 
the 1995 vintage was 200% as at the end of 2003. 
 
For European venture funds established during 1983-1997, corresponding to vintages 
that should no longer be negatively affected by the J-curve phenomenon, the average 
return by vintage is consistently positive as of end 2003, ranging from 1.1% to 19.7%, 
excluding the extraordinarily profitable 1995 vintage. The average return figures, 




European venture capital funds established in 1983-2003 
Dispersion of cumulative pooled average IRR since inception 
by quartile and by vintage year 




















































    Data source: Thomson Venture Economics 
 
Chart 2 above shows the dispersion of the cumulative return of European venture 
capital funds since inception for all vintages since 1983. Dispersion is illustrated by 
showing the cut-off points between the different profitability quartiles. The cut-off 
point of the upper quartile corresponds to the IRR of the least profitable fund among 
the 25.0% best performing funds in the relevant vintage sample. The cut-off point for 
the lower quartile corresponds to the IRR of the best performer of the 25% worst 
performing funds. 
 
Taking as an example the funds that started operations in 1996, half of them had an 
IRR of 9.7% or less at the end of 2003, when the funds were 7-8 years old. The worst 
25% of the funds had an IRR of 2.2% or less. The best 25% of the funds had an IRR 
of 25.0% or more. 
 
The dispersion of the returns generated by funds in the same vintage underlines the 
importance of fund selection for institutional investors that allocate funds for venture 
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capital investment. Failed fund selection is likely to result in inferior investment 
returns. 
 
3.2. INVESTMENT HORIZON RETURN OF EUROPEAN VENTURE FUNDS 
 
Investment horizon returns capture the aggregated performance of all funds in the 
dataset that were active in the reference period. For instance, the five year investment 
horizon data as of 31.12.2003 would pool the returns (cash and value appreciation of 
assets) generated by all funds in the sample during 1999-2003. Some of them could 
have been recently established, whereas others could have been operating for longer 




Table 2 presents the pooled average IRRs of the European venture capital funds for a 
range of investment horizons as of the end of 2003 and broken down by the 
development stage of the investee companies. The table also contains data on private 
equity funds to position venture capital in the wider context of private equity at large. 




European venture capital and private equity investment 
Pooled average IRR% for investment horizon of 1, 3, 5, 10 and 20 years 
as of 31.12.2003 










Early stage  -13.1  -11.1  -1.8    1.3    1.9 
Development    -7.2    -4.8   4.6  10.7    9.1 
Balanced    -5.4  -10.2   4.2  12.3    9.0 
Total venture    -7.5    -9.0   2.3    8.3    7.2 
Buyouts    -1.6     1.0   9.6  12.7  12.2 
Generalist      2.4  -10.7   7.8  14.6    9.1 
All Private equity    -0.6    -3.8   7.3  11.9    9.9 
Data source: EVCA/Thomson Venture Economics 
 
The negative IRRs shown for the 1, 3 and 5 year horizons should be an illustration of 
the J-curve and a reflection of the proportionately higher weighting of funds of recent 
vintages in the datasets for shorter investment horizons. The declining IRRs for 
investment horizons beyond 10 years suggest that there are funds in the dataset that 
have failed to sell holdings in investee companies whose high growth period has come 
to an end. The return figures lead to the following conclusions: 
 
•  As a whole, the returns produced by European venture capital funds specialising 
in early stage (seed capital and start-up) investment have been disappointing. A 
                                                 
5 For example, referring to table 2, an investor who had an equal proportionate holding in all 
venture capital funds that were operating in 1999-2003, would have achieved an IRR of 2.3%.  
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five year investment horizon IRR of -1.8% combined with a ten year horizon 
figure of 1.3% cannot be considered to meet the objectives of investors. 
 
•  Venture investment in development stage companies has shown substantially 
better results than early stage investment and for the 10 year investment horizon, 
corresponding to a sample in which recent funds are less prominent, shows a 
double digit return. However, taking into account the relatively high risk of this 
type of investing, the IRRs recorded do not appear competitive when compared to 
the more predictable buyout investing. 
 
•  Not surprisingly, investment in buyouts has produced the best returns. Buyout 
investment also appears more attractive than venture capital because of its 
shallower and narrower J-curve, in other words its lesser investment risk. 
 
The difference in performance between venture capital and private equity may well be 
the main explanation for the recent trend for European investment activity to focus on 
less risky buyout investment rather than venture capital. In 2003, funds raised for 
buyout investment amounted to €20.7 billion or 76% of total funds raised for private 




European venture capital investment 
Pooled average IRR% for investment horizons of 1, 3, 5, 10 and 20 years 

































3.3. INVESTMENT MULTIPLES OF EUROPEAN VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS  
 
As discussed in 2.2, IRRs alone are not an adequate measure of the performance of 
venture capital funds. Investment multiples are complementary indicators that provide 
an indication of the pay-back period of investments by distinguishing the realised 
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return of the fund from the residual value of investments that have not been exited. 
Below, table 3 presents the pooled investment multiples for European venture capital 
funds formed during the period 1980-2003, as of end 2003, as well as for private 
equity funds at large for the sake of comparison. To help complete the picture, the 
analysis then continues with an examination of venture capital investment multiples 




European venture capital and private equity investment 
Cumulative investment multiples for funds formed in 1980-2003 
as of 31.12.2003 





DPI  RVPI  TVPI 
Early stage  229  0.43  0.63  1.06 
Development 191  0.79  0.69  1.48 
Balanced 125  0.66  0.61  1.27 
Total venture  515  0.62  0.64  1.26 
Buyouts 292  0.65  0.68  1.33 
Generalist 74  0.98  0.37  1.35 
All private equity  881  0.71  0.61  1.32 
                      Data source: EVCA/Thomson Venture Economics 
 
 
The data suggests the following: 
 
•  On average, European venture capital funds formed since 1980 that focus on 
investment in early stage companies have only made distributions (DPI) to their 
investors that amount to 43% of the moneys paid into the funds. This appears a 
strikingly low figure for a sample that extends over a quarter of a century, and 
which should include a significant proportion of funds that have been fully 
liquidated. One contributing factor could be the high level of early stage 
investment during the bubble years combined with proportionately high failure 
rates when technology related asset values subsequently collapsed. Also the total 
value (TVPI) generated by early stage funds, which captures both distributions 
and the value of residual investments, amounts to only 106% of the moneys paid 
into the funds. The historical information on investment multiples reinforce the 
conclusions based on IRRs. 
 
•  Venture investment in development stage companies looks substantially better 
with 79% of the original cash paid in returned to investors and an estimated 
additional 69% worth of assets still held by the funds. As a subgroup of all private 
equity, it shows the best total value to cash paid in at 148%.  
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•  Concerning buyouts, the investment multiples are higher than those of overall 





European venture capital investment 
Cumulative investment multiples for funds formed in 1983-2003 











































































































































   Data source: Thomson Venture Economics 
 
 
The presentation of investment multiples by vintage gives an indication of the life 
span of European venture capital funds. From the year 1984 onwards, each vintage 
includes one or more funds that have not been fully liquidated. Put another way, the 
European sample includes funds that have operated up to 16-20 years without having 
managed to exit all their investments. The chart further suggests that it is usual for the 
time delay between the commencement of operations and the point at which the 
distributions to investors equal their paid in cash to be up to 10-12 years and longer.  
 
Secondly, and more surprisingly, there are several vintages composed of funds that 
are 10 years old or older (1985, 1991, 1993 and 1994), whose aggregate cumulative 
distributions have been less than the cash paid into the funds by investors. It 
obviously does not follow that all funds in the vintage were weak performers, but 
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4.  COMPARISON OF EUROPEAN AND US VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS 
 
 
4.1. EUROPEAN AND US IRRS BY VINTAGE YEAR  
 
Chart 5 below presents the pooled average IRRs since inception by vintage year for 
European and US venture capital funds for funds that started operations since 1983.  
 
Chart 5 
European and US venture capital funds established in 1983-2003 
Cumulative pooled average IRR since inception 


























































  Data source: Thomson Venture Economics 
 
US venture funds formed between 1983 and 1998 show consistently better returns 
than European funds that commenced operations during the same period. There is an 
unfavourable profitability differential between European and US funds for most of 
time period for which performance data is available. The vintage series 1999-2001 
shows a better pattern, but as it contains a high proportion of unproven funds, the 
better relative performance of European funds may turn out to be unsustainable. It 
should also be noted that the samples for the two latest vintages are less reliable 
because of their smallness. For Europe, there are only 15 funds for 2002 and 3 funds 
for 2003, and for the US 13 and 6, respectively. The reducing number of new funds 
started in 2002 and 2003 should reflect the general contraction of the venture capital 
industry in the wake of the bursting of the technology bubble. 
 
The performance gap between Europe and the US appears particularly pronounced for 
funds formed in the nineties, among which it varies between 8% (1990 vintage) and 
67% (1996 vintage). The investment period of these funds coincided with the 
technology boom, which could explain the high average returns that US funds have 
since generated for their investors. Also European funds do not appear to have 
benefited from the technology boom the same way as US funds. It could be that it was 
very closely associated with US centres, such as the Silicon Valley, leaving European 
players at a disadvantage in accessing opportunities, whether for investments or exits. 
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Chart 6 
US venture capital funds established in 1983-2003 
Dispersion of cumulative pooled average IRR since inception 
by quartile and by vintage year 



















































  Data source: Thomson Venture Economics 
 
Chart 6 presents the dispersion of the cumulative return of US venture capital funds 
since inception for all vintages since 1983. The presentation is the same as for 
European venture funds in chart 2. As before, dispersion is illustrated by the cut-off 
points between the different profitability quartiles. For US funds, the average vintage 
group return dispersion measured in terms of the gap between upper quartile IRR 
figures and the corresponding lower quartile figures was 30.4% for the vintages 1983-
2003. This is approximately double the equivalent European average of 17.4%. 
Particularly high return dispersions are shown for the 1995, 1996 and 1997 vintages, 
which should contain funds that generated extraordinary profits as a result of the 
technology boom. 
 
A comparison of the European and US return dispersions shows the US funds as 
much more consistent performers in line with economic conditions. For the US funds, 
the consistent yearly increase in the top quartile performance vintage from the 1991 
vintage to the 1996 vintage could be assumed to mirror the appreciation of the value 
of investments made in technology assets before the peaking of market values in 
2000. Concerning European funds, the performance of the top quartile funds of the 
same vintage series shows no particular pattern (chart 2) reinforcing the impression 
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4.2. INVESTMENT HORIZON RETURNS 
 
Table 4 below provides a snapshot of the profitability of US venture capital funds 
measured by pooled cumulative IRRs for various investment horizons as of end 2003, 
and broken down by investment stage. The definitions for development stages are not 
identical in Europe and the US, but similar enough to permit a broad comparison of 
the profitability of European and US funds. In the same way as for European data in 




 US venture capital and private equity investment 
Pooled average IRR% for investment horizon of 1, 3, 5, 10 and 20 years 
as of 31.12.2003 










Early/Seed  -7.0 -23.3 54.9 37.0 19.1 
Development 11.0  -13.9 19.4 20.4 13.3 
Later stage  25.4  -18.8    3.5  17.0  13.8 
Total venture    8.1  -18.9  22.8  25.4  15.5 
Buyouts  24.1     -2.1    2.2    7.8  12.4 
Mezzanine    5.7      1.1    5.6    7.3    9.6 
All Private equity  18.3     -7.0    6.8  12.7  13.6 
 
Data source: NVCA/Thomson Venture Economics 
 
The IRR figures in table 4 lead to the following conclusions: 
 
•  Overall, US venture capital funds provide respectable returns to their investors. 
An investor who held an equal proportionate share in all US venture funds that 
started operations during 1994-2003 would have had a cumulative IRR of 25.4% 
at the end of 2003. The returns from funds investing in early stage companies are 
shown as particularly high at 54.9% for five year horizon and 37.0% for ten year 
horizon. It has to be assumed that these figures are influenced by the conditions 
during the technology boom when extraordinarily high exit prices could be 
achieved. 
 
•  The pooled J-curve of the US venture capital firms appears to be significantly 
deeper and narrower than that of European funds. For US venture funds the three 
year time horizon IRR was -18.9% climbing to 22.8% for the five year horizon. 
The corresponding figures for European funds were -9.0% and 2.3%. This 
suggests that, on average, US venture capitalists support projects that are initially 
riskier than those of their European counterparts, but that the investee companies 
of the US venture capitalist turn around more quickly and more steeply. 
 
•  The returns generated by US private equity funds at large (including both venture 
capital and buy-out funds) are of the same magnitude as in Europe for the 
representative five and ten year time horizons. The high returns of US venture 
capital counterbalance the relatively better profitability of buyouts in the Europe. 
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Chart 7 
US venture capital investment 
Pooled average IRRs for investment horizons of 1, 3, 5, 10 and 20 years 



























       Data source: NVCA/Thomson Venture Economics 
 
The presentation of the IRRs of US venture investment for different investment stages 
contained in chart 7 above, gives a vivid illustration of the strength of the returns of 




European and US venture capital funds 
Cumulative pooled IRRs for investment horizons of 1, 3, 5, 10 and 20 years 




































    Data source: EVCA/NVCA/Thomson Venture Economics 
Chart 8 above compares the performance of European and US venture funds by 
presenting pooled average IRRs over various investment horizons. In this presentation 
some of the fluctuations shown in the vintage year IRR comparison are smoothed out, 
but the results are equally striking. The US venture capital industry as a whole was 
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substantially more profitable than the European one during the 5 and 10 year periods 
up to the end of 2003 as the IRR gaps of 20.5% and 17.1%, respectively, show. Also 
on the basis of a 20 year investment horizon investors in US venture funds fared 
substantially better, exceeding the IRR of the European ones by 8.4%. The narrowing 
of the performance gap for the very long investment horizon reflects both the low 
weighting of the technology bubble in this dataset and the proportionately high share 
of low performance funds that have not been able to exit investments in a timely way 





4.3. REALISED VERSUS UNREALISED RETURNS 
 
A comparison of the investment multiples of the European and US venture capital 
investment adds to the analysis by making the differences in the pattern of realised 
and unrealised gains visible. 
 
Chart 9 
European and US venture funds 
Total value per paid in capital (TPVI) by vintage  














































  Data source: Thomson Venture Economics 
 
The TVPIs (total value over paid in capital) given in chart 9 above show the US funds 
performing better than European ones in the same way as the analysis based on 
pooled average IRRs. While the TVPIs, which include both realised and unrealised 
investment gains, obviously paint a similar picture as vintage year IRRs, which also 
encompass all gains, a comparison of the realised gains of European and US funds 
reveal a high degree of difference. Chart 10 below shows the DPIs (distributions over 
paid in capital) for European and US venture funds by vintage. 
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Chart 10 
European and US venture funds 
Cumulative distributed value to paid in capital (DPI) by vintage 















































 Data source: Thomson Venture Economics 
Except for the two most recent vintages (for which zero average cash distributions are 
shown for both Europe and US), distributions to paid-in capital by US funds have 
been consistently higher than by European funds. US funds established in 1983-2003 
returned cash profits back to their investors much earlier than European funds. The 
shorter pay-back periods mean that investors are locked in for a shorter period of time 
and the risks brought upon by illiquidity reduced. 
 
Another observation to be taken from the chart is that in the US the DPI ratio, 
distributions to cash paid in, has been greater than 1 in all vintages in 1983-1998. On 
average, other than for the still immature vintages of 1999-2003, the cash returns 
realised by the fund investors have consistently exceeded the cash paid in by them.  
 
In Europe this has not always been the case: Distant vintage groups of funds, like the 
1991, 1993, 1994 vintages, have not yet been able to realise enough cash to pay back 
to investors the amounts disbursed with paid-in capital. Moreover, in Europe from 
1996 onwards the DPI ratio was still below one at the end of 2003, suggesting that 
European funds of recent vintages generate profits slower than US funds of the same 
vintages. 
 
The figures suggest that on average US venture funds realise their investments more 
quickly than the European ones. This could be caused by the shorter start-up and 
development periods of US investee companies. Another reason could be US venture 
capitalists’ skill in identifying potential buyers for their investee companies; the vast 
majority of exits are through trade sales, i.e. the sale of the investee company to an 
established company. It could also be that established US companies are generally 
more open for investment in new technology and as such more likely to invest time in 
the possible acquisition of a venture backed company. 
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Whatever the reasons behind the average slow distribution rate of European venture 
funds, it could be a significant factor in discouraging investment in European venture 




4.4. PUBLIC MARKETS BASED BENCHMARKS IN EUROPE AND IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Previously this paper analysed the performance of European and US venture capital 
funds in relation to the profitability of the asset class as a whole. Benchmarking 
against public stock market indices offers a tool for asset allocation by providing a 
measure of the opportunity cost in the trade-off between investment opportunities in 
different asset classes when they are mutually exclusive. Benchmarking against public 
markets also allows the relatively higher risks of venture capital and private equity 
investing to be factored in through the setting of a target return as the performance of 
the chosen index plus a risk premium. 
 
The benchmarking of venture capital and private equity investment to public markets 
provides an indication rather than an exact measure as it involves comparisons that are 
not like-to-like. It appears that investors and venture capitalists who benchmark 
against the public markets regard it as a performance check complementing IRR and 




Public markets returns vs. venture capital and private equity investment 
Investment horizon return IRR since inception for funds formed 1980-2003 
as of 31.12.2003 










Europe           
Venture Capital  -7.5    -9.0   2.3    8.3   7.2 
Private equity  -0.6    -3.8   7.3  11.9   9.9 
MSCI World Small Cap*  44.0     5.3   8.3   n.a.   n.a. 
United States           
Venture Capital    8.1 -18.9 22.8 25.4 15.5 
Private equity  18.3    -7.0    6.8  12.7  13.6 
S & P 500  26.4    -5.6   -2.0    9.1  12.9 
NASDAQ  50.0    -6.7   -1.8    9.9  12.4 
 
*Annualised historic returns based on local currency prices as of end 2003  
Sources: EVCA/NVCA/Thomson Venture Economics; MSCI Barra; Standard & Poor’s; Nasdaq  
 
Table 5 above presents some IRR investment horizon returns for venture capital and 
private equity investment together with the percentage movement of certain public 
market indices. For comparisons with public markets, it is customary to use 
investment horizon IRRs. In accordance with the practice of EVCA, the performance 
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Not surprisingly in light of the analysis presented earlier, as a whole, the performance 
of European venture capital and private equity funds does not compare favourably 
with the MSCI World SmallCap index. In contrast the performance of US funds is 
clearly competitive with public equity investing when measured against the five and 
ten year investment horizon up to the end of 2003. 
 
Despite the clear shortcomings of the analysis comparing venture capital and private 
equity funds to public equity investment, they underline the competitiveness of the US 
funds. The return margin produced by US venture capital funds for five and ten year 
investment horizons over and above public markets appear to be sufficient to 
accommodate an appropriate risk premium, for which 300 basis points could be given 





5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
On average, the profitability of the European venture capital industry appears not to 
fully meet the risk adjusted return requirements of institutional investors. Historically, 
the returns generated by funds specialising in investment in early stage companies 
appear particularly poor. An investor who held a proportionate share in all European 
early stage venture funds in the sample in the five years up to the end of 2003, would 
have booked a return of –1.8%. For a ten year period, the corresponding figure would 
have been 1.3%. Clearly, the underlying early stage investments were not made with 
low return expectations in mind, indicating that, on average, the business of the 
investee companies did not develop the way foreseen. This in turn means, again on 
average, that venture backed European early stage companies were unable to 
overcome the challenges they faced in commercialising innovation and new 
technology, despite of the management support that could have been expected to be 
provided by the venture capitalists.  
 
The late expansion of European venture investment in technology could have been a 
contributing factor in the disappointing performance of early stage investing. A 
relatively high share of European early stage investment could have been made during 
the period leading to the bursting of the technology bubble. This would mean that 
high prices would have been paid for investments, which only matured after the 
values of technology assets had collapsed leading to low investment returns. 
 
The low profitability of the European venture industry also raises the question of 
whether or not the current level asset allocation to venture capital by institutional 
investors will be maintained and how the right conditions can be created to improve 
confidence. The volume of funds raised for European venture capital investment in 
2001-2003 shows a declining trend for venture capital at large (chart 1) and for early 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that IRR returns are net returns to investors, whereas public market index 
returns are expressed in gross terms before trading costs. 
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stage venture investment as a sub-group. During the same period, fund-raising for 
buyouts was able to withstand downward pressures much better. The figures do not 
provide comfort even if it should be assumed that at least a part of the decline in fund 
raising for venture capital still reflects the aftermath of the bursting of the technology 
bubble. As the European institutional investors develop their capabilities in alternative 
investing, the likelihood of their expanding investment in the US on the expense of 
investment in Europe could increase. In medium term, the tendency of investors to 
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